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Failure is an option: The problems with NATO…

Posted by Tim Foxley at 2008-10-21 10:40 |

…as presented by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General John Craddock. NATO’s mission in Afghanistan seems increasingly to becoming one of extracting itself from Afghanistan with some shreds of credibility intact while maintaining the pretence that it is a viable organisation for the 21st century…

Failure is an option: The problems with NATO…

ISAF HQ

The General was in London talking at RUSI yesterday and many press articles picked up this pretty damning indictment of NATO’s lack of resolve and commitment in Afghanistan.  The article makes the points well enough, but to summarise:

  • It takes Nato an average of 80 days to respond to an urgent request for equipment from a commander in the field – according to NATO officials.
  • There are more than 70 caveats – restrictions on what individual nations will or will not do in Afghanistan – imposed by national governments on their NATO troops.
  • Craddock asks: "Do we really need to achieve consensus at every level" of NATO decision-making?

  • NATO countries were not delivering the number of troops they had promised. Another senior NATO official said: "I want more forces from all nations".
  • Craddock described NATO's operations in Afghanistan as "disjointed in time and space".
  • Craddock again: "It is this wavering political will that impedes operational progress and brings into question the relevancy of the alliance in the 21st century"


OK, this seems to be a very US-driven agenda imposed onto the alliance, but it seems to me that the surge needed to protect the elections could be achieved if the caveats were drastically reduced (there are a lot of soldiers already in the country but not many actually going out on the ground).  Then the UK/US surge of additional troops that looks increasingly likely for next year could concentrate on the business of confronting the Taliban instead of being diverted to guarding ballot boxes…

I also sense that the Taliban are starting to understanding that targeting “caveat-heavy” nations may represent good opportunities for further undermining ISAF/NATO resolve.

And futhermore, the recent NATO announcements that they will now allow anti-drug missions may have generated some good news headlines (and even appeared to temporarily placate US Defence Secretary Gates) but they do not look particularly convincing.  It is difficult to see any serious counter-narcotics campaigns initiated any time soon – my bet is that the caveats are still effectively in place: ‘members' participation is ``subject to the authorisation of specific nations”’, according to Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.  

National Caveats

Posted by Sebastian at 2008-10-28 12:40
As for the example of Germany, I strongly believe that there will be no decrease in the number of caveats... unfortunately... The German government fears nothing more than rising losses and in consequence to be forced by its citizens to withdraw troops from AFG. It hopes to keep own losses as low as possible with restricting the movement and field of operation of its troops... (If this is working properly can be doubted, regarding the youngest incident in Kunduz...) The inner logic of this "caveat tactics" might be, that the German government sees it as more important to formally fulfill it's alliance liabilities by simply being present than to really achieve something...

National Caveats

Posted by Tim at 2008-11-10 15:40
Sebastian - thanks. I have a feeling you are very right. I still believe that there is a high risk that a "caveat-heavy" nation will start attracting attacks as they come to be perceived as a weak link in the ISAF chain...

So much for "adaptive planning"

Posted by Ian at 2008-11-14 15:23
This is a general problem confronting NATO. Before 1991 forces had to be tightly integrated into an agreed plan that the military would execute without political interference once hostilities broke out. There was no time for debate or discussion prior to action. Nowadays there are opportunities to choose at all stages before, during and after a mission and countries will certainly use these opportunities. Afghanistan is too important to wait for an agreed institutional solution to this problem -- in fact how the problem is solved in Afghanistan from the "bottom up" is likely to set the pattern for the Alliance in future operations.

Adaptive anything...

Posted by Tim Foxley at 2008-11-14 15:30
Ian, absolutely - NATO was never designed for this sort of operation and has not proved to be as flexible, adaptable and as "hard-nosed" as it clearly needs to be. Face it - NATO drifted into this mission at a time when it was looking around to justify its existence and Afghanistan was then looking, if not relatively straightforward, at least "do-able". No one actually thought that they might be facing - from a British quote from 2006 - some of the hardest fighting since the Korean war. I think caveats have killed NATO.