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Taliban attacks getting more effective
Posted by
Tim Foxley
at
2008-08-20 18:02
|
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Two significant attacks were initiated by the Taliban yesterday. One resulted in the death of ten French soldiers and the wounding of 21. Taliban attacks have become larger and more confident in the last two years. Now they are becoming more effective.
ISAF at half mast
Two significant Taliban attacks took place yesterday, both in Eastern Afghanistan. One, in the Sarobi area of Kabul province, about 50 km east of Kabul, reportedly involved 100 or so Taliban fighters engaging a joint French and Afghan National Army reconnaissance force. Casualties on the ISAF side amounted to an appalling total 10 French soldiers killed and 21 wounded. In Khowst province, US forces managed to repel a series of coordinated suicide bomber attacks launched against Forward Operating Base Salerno.
Taliban “complex” and “brazen” attacks
It is one thing to see the Taliban operating in larger numbers, another thing to see them acting with increasing confidence, but quite another to see them fighting with real effectiveness. Although the Khowst attack saw no US deaths and actually appears another defeat for the Taliban, a coordinated wave of suicide bombers is a major step up in Taliban capability and confidence. The apparent confidence and increased fighting ability of these Taliban
attacks (we should not forget the near over-running of a US base in
Konar province last month which saw the loss of 9 US soldiers) recalls
the fighting of early 2002 in Operation Anaconda in the last desperate
battles against AQ and Taliban hard core remnants, before they withdrew
into Pakistan.
Small wonder, I guess, that this is what the Taliban seemed to be more interested in and not so much the casualties inflicted on the French – whom they initially referred to as American soldiers. It is noticeable that Taliban statements of casualties inflicted on ISAF forces have taken a real upward trend in exaggeration this year. Ironically, on a site that hosts Taliban statements, the battle against French forces merely looks par for the course amidst claims of 11 Canadians killed here and 12 Afghan police killed there.
Of course we will not see Sarkozy withdrawing French troops, but his ambitions to extend the role of French forces will certainly have been tempered. And what happens if the Taliban manage to achieve a few more of these double figure casualty attacks in a short space of time (as they will surely now be looking to do)? Well, if past performance is anything to go by, the Taliban will succumb to over-confidence and launch some slightly less considered attacks resulting in a lot of Taliban deaths for little gain.
But the international community cannot count on this and ISAF will struggle to sustain even a handful of these sort of incidents and these level of casualty figures if they happen in rapid and regular succession. I can see some ISAF forces finding more and more reasons to stay inside their bases or only move around in heavily armed and armoured convoys with little scope for interaction with the population they are there to assist. Maybe not now, but in one or two years time, some ISAF nations will be finding reasons not to renew their contract and quietly start calling their troops home.
your comments...
Posted by
Tim Foxley
at
2008-08-22 08:36
Chris - I think, after several years of denouncing the idea that the Taliban do not single out dates, anniversaries and significant events for special attacks, I may have to revise my assessment (don't you hate it when that happens?). In itself I think this is indicative of growing confidence. I guess we can expect another Mullah Omar message, as he did last year, to greet the Afghan people. However, I'm still not the sure the Taliban are yet exploiting these incidents effectively in the media/propaganda environment. I'll shy away from spelling out what I think they should be doing...
War on Terror
Posted by
John Maszka
at
2008-09-02 11:36
An Escalation of the War in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Very Bad Policy.
Conservatives and liberals can argue the merits of the surge in Iraq, or the need to deal with terrorism now rather than later. I want to focus on something else: the impact of the perspective of 1.5 billion Muslims around the world. I’m not implying that it is somehow homogeneous, just relevant; more relevant than my opinion at least.
Taking the war on terror back to Afghanistan (and most likely Pakistan) is bad for a number of reasons: the perspective of the international Muslim community; the fact that a military solution has not worked thus far, so why keep kicking a dead horse (especially when it has the potential to trample you); the delicate balance of power in the immediate theatre and in the broader region; the likely negative reaction of other states; and last but not least, its potential impact on the price and availability of oil.
Pakistan’s reaction to the Bush Doctrine has been somewhat mixed. Musharraf was caught in the middle between pleasing the U.S. to ensure continued military and economic support, and the preferences of his constituents who resent the U.S. presence there. The region is already very unstable because of this tension between the US applying pressure from the outside and the internal desire of the populace to rid themselves of the unwanted American presence.
We can say the exact same thing about Afghanistan, Karzai is in a very similar position as Musharraf was. In 2006, Karzai had to start rearming the warlords to maintain order. Similarly, in September 2006, Pakistan was forced to recognize the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan - a loose group of Waziristani chieftains, closely associated with the Taliban, who now serve as the de facto security force in charge of North and South Waziristan.
If Senator Obama becomes president, and refocuses the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the best we can hope for is another five to six years of what we’ve seen in Iraq. But this best-case scenario is very unlikely.
In addition to a multiple-front war, we would be dealing, not with a fallen state as with Iraq, but with two established states. This could possibly work in our favor as long as they continue to remain on our side. But as already mentioned, the tension is high, and there is a very delicate balance keeping Karzai in power. What if Karzai falls to a coup or assassination? And now with Musharraf stepping down, what happens if Musharraf’s successor plays to the popular demands of the people? We could find ourselves fighting the armies of the sovereign states of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in addition to insurgent forces there. If we consider the history of this region, we realize that this is not as far-fetched as it might sound on the face of it.
As we all know, the Taliban was comprised of Sunni Islamists and Pashtun nationalists (mostly from southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan). The Taliban initially enjoyed support from the U.S., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in the early 1980s to fight the Soviets. By 1996, the Taliban had gained control of most of Afghanistan, but its relationship with the U.S. and most of the rest of the world became strained. Most of the international community supported the Taliban’s rival, the Afghan Northern Alliance.
Still, even after the U.S. began to distance itself from the Taliban in late 1997, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates continued to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Even after 9/11 when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates officially stopped recognizing the Taliban, Pakistan continued to support it. The Taliban in turn, had tremendous influence in Pakistani politics, especially among lobby groups- as it virtually controlled areas such as the Pashtun Belt (Southeast Afghanistan, and Northwest Pakistan) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Going back to the perception of the international Muslim community … When the U.S. demanded that the Taliban turn Bin Laden over, it initially offered to turn Bin Laden over to Pakistan to be tried by an international tribunal operating according to Sharia law. But Pakistan was urged by the U.S. to refuse. Again, prior to the beginning of U.S. air strikes against Afghanistan, the Taliban offered to try Bin Laden according to Islamic law, but the U.S. refused. After the U.S. began air strikes, the Taliban offered to hand Bin Laden over to a neutral state to be tried under Islamic law, but the U.S. again refused. This is important because in the eyes of the greater international community, the war in Afghanistan was justified (at least initially). But in the eyes of the international Muslim community, especially given the Taliban’s offer to turn over Bin Laden, it was an unnecessary war. This, combined with the preemptive war in Iraq, has led many Muslims to equate the war on terror with a war on Islam. Senator Obama’s plan to escalate the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan will only serve to reinforce that impression.
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, an Islamic political party in Pakistan, won elections in two out of four provinces in 2003, and became the third largest political party in the Pakistani parliament – with substantial support from urban areas (not just border regions). This speaks to the tremendous influence Islamic groups enjoy in Pakistan.
This strong influence is fueled by the fact that the Pashtun tribal group is over 40 million strong. The Taliban continues to receive many of its members from this group today. In fact, the Pakistani army suffered humiliating defeat at the hand of these so-called “insurgents.” Finally, in September 2006, Pakistan was forced to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan. Many saw the Pakistani government’s acknowledgment of the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan as not only a military necessity, but also a political one as well – a concession in response to the growing internal pressure on the Musharraf administration from the people of Pakistan who resent the U.S. presence and involvement in the region.
Just consider the many, many public protests against the Pakistani government’s compliance with the United States. For instance, on January 13, 2006, the United States launched a missile strike on the village of Damadola, Pakistan. Rather than kill the targeted Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, the strike instead slaughtered 17 locals. This only served to further weaken the Musharraf government and further destabilize the entire area.
On October 30, 2006, the Pakistani military, under pressure from the U.S., attacked a madrasah in the Northwest Frontier province in Pakistan. Immediately following the attack, local residents, convinced the U.S. military was behind the attack, burned American flags and effigies of President Bush, and shouted “Death to America!” Outraged over an attack on school children, the local residents viewed the attack as an assault against Islam. On November 7, 2006, a suicide bomber retaliated. Further outrage ensued when President Bush extended his condolences to the families of the victims of the suicide attack, and President Musharraf did the same, without ever offering their condolences to the families of the slaughtered children.
Last year troubles escalated surrounding the Pakistani government’s siege of the Red Mosque where more than 100 people were killed. Even before Musharraf’s soldiers took the Lal Masjid the retaliations began. Suicide attacks originating from both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani tribal militants targeted military convoys and a police recruiting center.
There are countless more examples; too many to mention in detail. Likewise in Afghanistan; April 30, 2007 for example, when hundreds of Afghans protested US soldiers killing Afghan civilians. Why can’t the powers that be recognize that we’ve been in Afghanistan for nearly seven years, and in Iraq for over five; a military approach is not working. If we must focus the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan, let’s focus on winning the hearts and minds of the beautiful people of these countries, rather than filling their hearts with bitterness and hatred toward us. With their support, we can offer them the financial and technical assistance that they need to rebuild their infrastructure, their agriculture and their economy. With their support, we can offer them the needed resources to rebuild their human capital and start attracting foreign direct investment. But without their support, we cannot possibly have any positive influence in this region at all; our only influence will be that of brute force, bribery of corrupt officials, and outright coercion. It will be a long, hard, costly and bloody endeavor, and the people of these countries will continue to suffer.
Let’s not forget that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Let’s not also forget that this is a highly Muslim-concentrated area, the Islamic concept of duty to come to the aid of fellow Muslims would no doubt ensure a huge influx of jihadists in this type of a scenario. Why on earth would we want to intentionally provoke a situation that would not only radicalize existing moderates in the region, but could also potentially cause the influx of a concentration of radical jihadists from elsewhere into an already unstable region (that has nuclear weapons no less)? We would be begging for a nuclear proliferation problem.
We like to assume that we would have the upper hand in such a scenario. But we have been in Afghanistan since October of 2001. And we have yet to assume the upper hand. The fight in Afghanistan has the potential to become much more difficult than it already is. Nor would it be unheard of to expect other major powers to back these radical jihadists with economic and military assistance in much the same way that the US backed the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Beyond the fact that roughly 1/5 of the world’s population is Muslim (approximately 1.5 billion people- 85% Sunni, 15% Shia, Ibadiyyas, Ahmadis and Druze), we have to remember that Muslims are the majority in 57 states (out of 195). Most of these have Sunni majorities, which gives them added political power.
China has traditionally backed Pakistan. What would China do if the US were to find itself at war with Pakistan?
India has tremendous economic and security interests in the region. Let’s not forget that while India has been in nearly continual conflict with Pakistan, primarily over the Kashmir issue, it has the second largest Muslim population in the world next to Indonesia. What happens if India were to side with the U.S. in a potential conflict with Pakistan? It will have a very difficult task justifying that position with its very large Muslim population. A U.S.-Indian alliance could also spark more terrorist attacks in the Kashmir region; it could also create added tension to the already tenuous relationship between India and Iran, which has a long history of support for Pakistan. Or, if radicals gained control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, a nuclear attack against India could spark a nuclear altercation between the two nuclear powers. Or, what if radicals then gained control of India’s nuclear arsenal?
On the other hand, what happens if India for some reason (either via a coup or due to Muslims gaining the upper hand in the long-running Hindu-Muslim conflict) were to side with Pakistan against the United States? It seems unlikely now, but not completely unrealistic considering the on-again, off-again relationship between the U.S. and every country in that region. We constantly flip-flop in our foreign policy. An attack on Pakistani soil would be a perfect example of this type of wishy-washy foreign policy, as the Bush administration guaranteed Musharraf that the U.S. would never do such a thing (as much as Karzai wants us to). Speaking of Karzai, what if he is ousted and we find ourselves at war with Afghanistan. What would India do then, given its friendship with Afghanistan?
Also consider the U.S. position on Kashmir, which has a predominantly Muslim population. Pakistan wants a plebiscite, as called for in a 1949 UN resolution, to essentially allow the people to decide which state the region should belong to. India refuses a plebiscite, claiming Kashmir and Jammu as an integral part of India. The U.S. is arming both sides through billions in aid to Pakistan and selective proliferation to India, but insists Pakistan stem terrorist activities flowing from inside its borders, and at the same time discourages India from attacking Pakistan. Yet an escalation of war in the area could backfire badly.
Beyond all that we still have to consider a slew of other states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia – not to mention the central Asian states - all of which have economic and/or political and security interests in the region. How will they react to an escalation of the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Finally, what would such a scenario do to oil prices and availability? I’m 100% in favor of America developing alternative energy sources, but again that’s my opinion, and the oil conglomerates have not been listening to me. Unfortunately, the facts are that the oil lobby is a very powerful entity. Even more to the point, our country could not ween itself off of oil overnight, even if it wanted to. We have to consider what such an escalation would do to oil prices, and the overall availability of oil.
The oil embargo of 1974 (in support of Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur war against Israel), in retaliation against the U.S. for its support of Israel had devastating economic and political consequences on the U.S. and much of Europe. Also, the more recent boycott of Danish products across the Muslim world, in retaliation for the 2005 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, demonstrates the ability of the international Muslim community to act collectively.
Escalating the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan would also demonstrate the fickle and hypocritical nature of America’s foreign policy. We supported the Taliban when it served our interests (to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan) in spite of clear human rights abuses. But now we condemn the Taliban (and much of the Muslim world) over the very same human rights abuses (against women … etc.), while we also continue to ignore similar or same human rights abuses in China, Saudi Arabia, Israel … etc., when it’s convenient for us to do so. We did the same thing with Saddam Hussein; arming him in spite of clear and egregious human rights abuses when he was our ally, and condemning the same actions when he wasn’t.
The U.S. practices selective proliferation with India, and selective sovereignty with those it chooses (today Pakistan, tomorrow someone other than Pakistan), while at the same time violating the sovereignty of other states- depending on its whim at the time.
The United States government insisted that the Taliban turn over Bin Laden, but the United States itself has refused on several occasions to return foreign nationals (being held on death row in America) to their state of domicile because the U.S. wanted them to face execution, and the home state did not uphold the death penalty. We also continue to refuse to acknowledge the ICC because we don’t want American military personnel tried in an international court. How is that so different from the Taliban wanting Bin Laden tried in an Islamic court?
Rather than blindly accepting that America holds some God-given moral superiority over the rest of the planet, we need to realize that everywhere, humanity has a God-given right to live, love and prosper. Our children have the right to grow up in an environment free of air strikes and constant assault from an external enemy. They have the right to attend schools without fear of being maimed and killed inside of them. And they have the right to be children, instead of orphans. No state has the right to take that away from your children, or from mine. Imagine now that Senator Obama is planning to escalate the war on terror where you live.
Conservatives and liberals can argue the merits of the surge in Iraq, or the need to deal with terrorism now rather than later. I want to focus on something else: the impact of the perspective of 1.5 billion Muslims around the world. I’m not implying that it is somehow homogeneous, just relevant; more relevant than my opinion at least.
Taking the war on terror back to Afghanistan (and most likely Pakistan) is bad for a number of reasons: the perspective of the international Muslim community; the fact that a military solution has not worked thus far, so why keep kicking a dead horse (especially when it has the potential to trample you); the delicate balance of power in the immediate theatre and in the broader region; the likely negative reaction of other states; and last but not least, its potential impact on the price and availability of oil.
Pakistan’s reaction to the Bush Doctrine has been somewhat mixed. Musharraf was caught in the middle between pleasing the U.S. to ensure continued military and economic support, and the preferences of his constituents who resent the U.S. presence there. The region is already very unstable because of this tension between the US applying pressure from the outside and the internal desire of the populace to rid themselves of the unwanted American presence.
We can say the exact same thing about Afghanistan, Karzai is in a very similar position as Musharraf was. In 2006, Karzai had to start rearming the warlords to maintain order. Similarly, in September 2006, Pakistan was forced to recognize the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan - a loose group of Waziristani chieftains, closely associated with the Taliban, who now serve as the de facto security force in charge of North and South Waziristan.
If Senator Obama becomes president, and refocuses the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the best we can hope for is another five to six years of what we’ve seen in Iraq. But this best-case scenario is very unlikely.
In addition to a multiple-front war, we would be dealing, not with a fallen state as with Iraq, but with two established states. This could possibly work in our favor as long as they continue to remain on our side. But as already mentioned, the tension is high, and there is a very delicate balance keeping Karzai in power. What if Karzai falls to a coup or assassination? And now with Musharraf stepping down, what happens if Musharraf’s successor plays to the popular demands of the people? We could find ourselves fighting the armies of the sovereign states of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in addition to insurgent forces there. If we consider the history of this region, we realize that this is not as far-fetched as it might sound on the face of it.
As we all know, the Taliban was comprised of Sunni Islamists and Pashtun nationalists (mostly from southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan). The Taliban initially enjoyed support from the U.S., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in the early 1980s to fight the Soviets. By 1996, the Taliban had gained control of most of Afghanistan, but its relationship with the U.S. and most of the rest of the world became strained. Most of the international community supported the Taliban’s rival, the Afghan Northern Alliance.
Still, even after the U.S. began to distance itself from the Taliban in late 1997, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates continued to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Even after 9/11 when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates officially stopped recognizing the Taliban, Pakistan continued to support it. The Taliban in turn, had tremendous influence in Pakistani politics, especially among lobby groups- as it virtually controlled areas such as the Pashtun Belt (Southeast Afghanistan, and Northwest Pakistan) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Going back to the perception of the international Muslim community … When the U.S. demanded that the Taliban turn Bin Laden over, it initially offered to turn Bin Laden over to Pakistan to be tried by an international tribunal operating according to Sharia law. But Pakistan was urged by the U.S. to refuse. Again, prior to the beginning of U.S. air strikes against Afghanistan, the Taliban offered to try Bin Laden according to Islamic law, but the U.S. refused. After the U.S. began air strikes, the Taliban offered to hand Bin Laden over to a neutral state to be tried under Islamic law, but the U.S. again refused. This is important because in the eyes of the greater international community, the war in Afghanistan was justified (at least initially). But in the eyes of the international Muslim community, especially given the Taliban’s offer to turn over Bin Laden, it was an unnecessary war. This, combined with the preemptive war in Iraq, has led many Muslims to equate the war on terror with a war on Islam. Senator Obama’s plan to escalate the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan will only serve to reinforce that impression.
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, an Islamic political party in Pakistan, won elections in two out of four provinces in 2003, and became the third largest political party in the Pakistani parliament – with substantial support from urban areas (not just border regions). This speaks to the tremendous influence Islamic groups enjoy in Pakistan.
This strong influence is fueled by the fact that the Pashtun tribal group is over 40 million strong. The Taliban continues to receive many of its members from this group today. In fact, the Pakistani army suffered humiliating defeat at the hand of these so-called “insurgents.” Finally, in September 2006, Pakistan was forced to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan. Many saw the Pakistani government’s acknowledgment of the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan as not only a military necessity, but also a political one as well – a concession in response to the growing internal pressure on the Musharraf administration from the people of Pakistan who resent the U.S. presence and involvement in the region.
Just consider the many, many public protests against the Pakistani government’s compliance with the United States. For instance, on January 13, 2006, the United States launched a missile strike on the village of Damadola, Pakistan. Rather than kill the targeted Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, the strike instead slaughtered 17 locals. This only served to further weaken the Musharraf government and further destabilize the entire area.
On October 30, 2006, the Pakistani military, under pressure from the U.S., attacked a madrasah in the Northwest Frontier province in Pakistan. Immediately following the attack, local residents, convinced the U.S. military was behind the attack, burned American flags and effigies of President Bush, and shouted “Death to America!” Outraged over an attack on school children, the local residents viewed the attack as an assault against Islam. On November 7, 2006, a suicide bomber retaliated. Further outrage ensued when President Bush extended his condolences to the families of the victims of the suicide attack, and President Musharraf did the same, without ever offering their condolences to the families of the slaughtered children.
Last year troubles escalated surrounding the Pakistani government’s siege of the Red Mosque where more than 100 people were killed. Even before Musharraf’s soldiers took the Lal Masjid the retaliations began. Suicide attacks originating from both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani tribal militants targeted military convoys and a police recruiting center.
There are countless more examples; too many to mention in detail. Likewise in Afghanistan; April 30, 2007 for example, when hundreds of Afghans protested US soldiers killing Afghan civilians. Why can’t the powers that be recognize that we’ve been in Afghanistan for nearly seven years, and in Iraq for over five; a military approach is not working. If we must focus the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan, let’s focus on winning the hearts and minds of the beautiful people of these countries, rather than filling their hearts with bitterness and hatred toward us. With their support, we can offer them the financial and technical assistance that they need to rebuild their infrastructure, their agriculture and their economy. With their support, we can offer them the needed resources to rebuild their human capital and start attracting foreign direct investment. But without their support, we cannot possibly have any positive influence in this region at all; our only influence will be that of brute force, bribery of corrupt officials, and outright coercion. It will be a long, hard, costly and bloody endeavor, and the people of these countries will continue to suffer.
Let’s not forget that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Let’s not also forget that this is a highly Muslim-concentrated area, the Islamic concept of duty to come to the aid of fellow Muslims would no doubt ensure a huge influx of jihadists in this type of a scenario. Why on earth would we want to intentionally provoke a situation that would not only radicalize existing moderates in the region, but could also potentially cause the influx of a concentration of radical jihadists from elsewhere into an already unstable region (that has nuclear weapons no less)? We would be begging for a nuclear proliferation problem.
We like to assume that we would have the upper hand in such a scenario. But we have been in Afghanistan since October of 2001. And we have yet to assume the upper hand. The fight in Afghanistan has the potential to become much more difficult than it already is. Nor would it be unheard of to expect other major powers to back these radical jihadists with economic and military assistance in much the same way that the US backed the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Beyond the fact that roughly 1/5 of the world’s population is Muslim (approximately 1.5 billion people- 85% Sunni, 15% Shia, Ibadiyyas, Ahmadis and Druze), we have to remember that Muslims are the majority in 57 states (out of 195). Most of these have Sunni majorities, which gives them added political power.
China has traditionally backed Pakistan. What would China do if the US were to find itself at war with Pakistan?
India has tremendous economic and security interests in the region. Let’s not forget that while India has been in nearly continual conflict with Pakistan, primarily over the Kashmir issue, it has the second largest Muslim population in the world next to Indonesia. What happens if India were to side with the U.S. in a potential conflict with Pakistan? It will have a very difficult task justifying that position with its very large Muslim population. A U.S.-Indian alliance could also spark more terrorist attacks in the Kashmir region; it could also create added tension to the already tenuous relationship between India and Iran, which has a long history of support for Pakistan. Or, if radicals gained control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, a nuclear attack against India could spark a nuclear altercation between the two nuclear powers. Or, what if radicals then gained control of India’s nuclear arsenal?
On the other hand, what happens if India for some reason (either via a coup or due to Muslims gaining the upper hand in the long-running Hindu-Muslim conflict) were to side with Pakistan against the United States? It seems unlikely now, but not completely unrealistic considering the on-again, off-again relationship between the U.S. and every country in that region. We constantly flip-flop in our foreign policy. An attack on Pakistani soil would be a perfect example of this type of wishy-washy foreign policy, as the Bush administration guaranteed Musharraf that the U.S. would never do such a thing (as much as Karzai wants us to). Speaking of Karzai, what if he is ousted and we find ourselves at war with Afghanistan. What would India do then, given its friendship with Afghanistan?
Also consider the U.S. position on Kashmir, which has a predominantly Muslim population. Pakistan wants a plebiscite, as called for in a 1949 UN resolution, to essentially allow the people to decide which state the region should belong to. India refuses a plebiscite, claiming Kashmir and Jammu as an integral part of India. The U.S. is arming both sides through billions in aid to Pakistan and selective proliferation to India, but insists Pakistan stem terrorist activities flowing from inside its borders, and at the same time discourages India from attacking Pakistan. Yet an escalation of war in the area could backfire badly.
Beyond all that we still have to consider a slew of other states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia – not to mention the central Asian states - all of which have economic and/or political and security interests in the region. How will they react to an escalation of the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Finally, what would such a scenario do to oil prices and availability? I’m 100% in favor of America developing alternative energy sources, but again that’s my opinion, and the oil conglomerates have not been listening to me. Unfortunately, the facts are that the oil lobby is a very powerful entity. Even more to the point, our country could not ween itself off of oil overnight, even if it wanted to. We have to consider what such an escalation would do to oil prices, and the overall availability of oil.
The oil embargo of 1974 (in support of Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur war against Israel), in retaliation against the U.S. for its support of Israel had devastating economic and political consequences on the U.S. and much of Europe. Also, the more recent boycott of Danish products across the Muslim world, in retaliation for the 2005 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, demonstrates the ability of the international Muslim community to act collectively.
Escalating the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan would also demonstrate the fickle and hypocritical nature of America’s foreign policy. We supported the Taliban when it served our interests (to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan) in spite of clear human rights abuses. But now we condemn the Taliban (and much of the Muslim world) over the very same human rights abuses (against women … etc.), while we also continue to ignore similar or same human rights abuses in China, Saudi Arabia, Israel … etc., when it’s convenient for us to do so. We did the same thing with Saddam Hussein; arming him in spite of clear and egregious human rights abuses when he was our ally, and condemning the same actions when he wasn’t.
The U.S. practices selective proliferation with India, and selective sovereignty with those it chooses (today Pakistan, tomorrow someone other than Pakistan), while at the same time violating the sovereignty of other states- depending on its whim at the time.
The United States government insisted that the Taliban turn over Bin Laden, but the United States itself has refused on several occasions to return foreign nationals (being held on death row in America) to their state of domicile because the U.S. wanted them to face execution, and the home state did not uphold the death penalty. We also continue to refuse to acknowledge the ICC because we don’t want American military personnel tried in an international court. How is that so different from the Taliban wanting Bin Laden tried in an Islamic court?
Rather than blindly accepting that America holds some God-given moral superiority over the rest of the planet, we need to realize that everywhere, humanity has a God-given right to live, love and prosper. Our children have the right to grow up in an environment free of air strikes and constant assault from an external enemy. They have the right to attend schools without fear of being maimed and killed inside of them. And they have the right to be children, instead of orphans. No state has the right to take that away from your children, or from mine. Imagine now that Senator Obama is planning to escalate the war on terror where you live.
Your thoughts...
Posted by
Tim
at
2008-09-02 12:15
John, many thanks for your contribution - although I have the tiniest suspicion that this piece may not have been written in direct response to my thoughts... ;)
You provide some very helpful and thought-provking analysis, but I can't help feeling that you fall into a trap that many analysts fall into from time to time (myself very definitely included). The easiest part of writing analysis on Afghanistan is the ripping apart of the actions and activities of the Afghan government, the US government and the international Community, more generally. Everything is done in a poorly coordinated way, self-interest abounds, etc... The tricky bit is to propose viable shifts in strategy and plausible new solutions, particularly given that 90 degree changes in direction and strategy probably do more harm than good and many countries providing (or attempting to provide) assistance to Afgahnistan probably do not want to undertake anything that might be more risky or counter to their views on assistance. Your solution ("...recognise a military solution is not working...focus on winning the hearts and minds...offer them the financial and technical assistance that they need to rebuild...offer them the needed resources to rebuild their human capital...) seems to be a restatement of the conclusions the international community more or less all reached a few years ago. This is all being done! of course, different groups understand the idea in different ways, but it is quite a thing to still be reading analysts, journalists, generals, politicians, diplomats, aid workers etc, etc all stating as if it was a major new theory that a counter-insurgency cannot be won by purely military means. If a change of path is necessary (and I'm certainly not saying we should necessarily stay where we are) we need concrete and practical plans that reflect the realities of one of the most complex and volatile regions in the world. This probably means gradual and small shifts in emphasis in what the international community is doing and not a revolutionary change in direction - the place is pretty unstable as it is! Well, you may think I am disagreeing with you, but really I'm not - I would just like to hear your solution in a bit more detail. How do we "...focus on winning the hearts and minds..."? How do we tackle the Taliban without use of airpower? How do we manage the expectations of the Afghans? How do we quickly improve the capabilities of the ANA and ANP, not to mention the judicary? How do we provide "alternative livelihoods" easily such that people give up growing poppy?
Tim
You provide some very helpful and thought-provking analysis, but I can't help feeling that you fall into a trap that many analysts fall into from time to time (myself very definitely included). The easiest part of writing analysis on Afghanistan is the ripping apart of the actions and activities of the Afghan government, the US government and the international Community, more generally. Everything is done in a poorly coordinated way, self-interest abounds, etc... The tricky bit is to propose viable shifts in strategy and plausible new solutions, particularly given that 90 degree changes in direction and strategy probably do more harm than good and many countries providing (or attempting to provide) assistance to Afgahnistan probably do not want to undertake anything that might be more risky or counter to their views on assistance. Your solution ("...recognise a military solution is not working...focus on winning the hearts and minds...offer them the financial and technical assistance that they need to rebuild...offer them the needed resources to rebuild their human capital...) seems to be a restatement of the conclusions the international community more or less all reached a few years ago. This is all being done! of course, different groups understand the idea in different ways, but it is quite a thing to still be reading analysts, journalists, generals, politicians, diplomats, aid workers etc, etc all stating as if it was a major new theory that a counter-insurgency cannot be won by purely military means. If a change of path is necessary (and I'm certainly not saying we should necessarily stay where we are) we need concrete and practical plans that reflect the realities of one of the most complex and volatile regions in the world. This probably means gradual and small shifts in emphasis in what the international community is doing and not a revolutionary change in direction - the place is pretty unstable as it is! Well, you may think I am disagreeing with you, but really I'm not - I would just like to hear your solution in a bit more detail. How do we "...focus on winning the hearts and minds..."? How do we tackle the Taliban without use of airpower? How do we manage the expectations of the Afghans? How do we quickly improve the capabilities of the ANA and ANP, not to mention the judicary? How do we provide "alternative livelihoods" easily such that people give up growing poppy?
Tim
The evolving Taleban Modus Operandi
Posted by
James
at
2008-09-03 13:50
What you are seeing happening with the multiple different Taleban groups, is a fundamental shift in the mode of operation from direct, mujahideen assaults targeting the police and military structure and personnel; to true terrorist tactics as used by Al-Quaida in Iraq.
The recent killing of aid workers and attack without regard for civilian casualties, as well as the increased use of improvised explosive devices and mines demonstrates this trend. This is probably a more effective course for the Taliban, as if they can stop the work of the NGO's by killing their personnel, they can stop development. This would cause the Afghan people to lose what little faith they still have in the government, and lean towards new groups that can provide security.
Unfortunately the task is made easy for the Taleban because of the attitude of the international personnel employed by NGO's in Afghanistan. Many think they are on some kind of adventure holiday, thus their working hours are short and very little gets done. This blasé attitude, and refusal to accept they are working in an increasingly dangerous environment is going to result in more deaths unfortunately, as lessons have not been learned by NGO's and their advisors from Iraq.
Do not think I am too critical of NGO's as many Governmental departments have similar attitudes. I could single out the Department For International Development as probably the biggest waste of UK taxpayers money...
Taliban modus operandi
Posted by
Tim Foxley
at
2008-09-03 15:23
James welcome and many thanks for your thoughts - not sure I agree entirely on your views on modus operandi, however. I don't think any of the Taliban evolutions in the way they take the war to the international community can be described as "fundamental". If anything, the Taliban are consistently failing to chase out the NGOs by failing to really proactively target them - and to announce this via their various communications media. In fact, it seems to me that we are probably seeing a slight return to these "direct mujahideen assaults" - as you describe them - the blitz on the French, the near overrunning of the US base in eastern Afghanistan, the reported killing of over 200 Taliban (verification/confirmation issues aside) this week. It all suggests to me that, given the chance, they instinctively revert to classic Mujahideen tactics. This generally means that after a couple of good results for them, they will get over-confident and get caught by western airpower and then they lie low for a bit. Attacks on NGOs and international civilians have been ongoing ever since 2002 - MSF pulled out after 5 of their team were killed in, I think 2004, 10+ Chinese construction workers were killed around the same time. Every so often the media get hold of it as a "Taliban now changing tactics and targeting civilian aid workers" story), but really, I 'm sure I've heard this story every year for the last 5 or 6. Using AQ style tactics is also problematic for the Taliban - yes IEDs, yes kidnapping - but is this really hard core AQ style?? They still seem much happier running around with an AK and RPG, surely?? Perhaps their best hope for the AQ style was the now-deceased Mullah Dadullah-Lang. Watch the Taliban deny responsibility when too many Afghan citizens get killed in a suicide bombing. The Indian embassy attack was not claimed by them. They were quite prepared to strike a deal to release the South Korean hostages... If you look at their website statements (and this blog refers) they are actually quite worried that the world sees them as indifferent to killing civilians and suggested an "international commission" to investigate who is killing more civilians in Afghanistan.
Cheers
Tim
Cheers
Tim
Taleban Operations
Posted by
James
at
2008-09-08 12:34
Dear Tim,
Not a bad answer, I think you need to rely less on media sources however. AQ mode of attack has never been 'running around with an AK and RPG' as you put it this is only for media consumption. In fact the tactics have always been IED/mine initiated with a small-arms follow up and the use of the suicide and vehicle bomb. We are now starting to see throughout Afghanistan the increased use of the body borne IED in smaller incidents, for example with the failed attack on the Ministry of Interior in Kabul and the closing down of a terrorist cell living opposite the Parliament building. In the first case the bomber was a 14 year old who, thank heavens, was not stupid enough to commit this atrocity, in the second it was believed the group was planning an assault similar to the Serena Hotel attack, (Classic AQ, vehicle borne IED to breach the perimiter followed by AK wielding attackers wearing suicide vests to penetrate the interior of the hotel)
One of the main advocates of these new tactics is Jalluddin Haqqani who is credited with introducing suicide bombing to the region and also claimed the Serena Hotel assault. The death of Mullah Dadullah-Lang does not mean the Taleban are not open to new tactics.
I do agree that the Taliban are still keen to launch mass assaults, probably due to the fact that they have worked so effectively on the other side of the border in Pakistan. I see you mention Airpower, unfortunately the Taliban when they commit to an assault are becoming increasingly less intimidated by airpower. For example in the US incident you mention, the assault started at first light and continued throughout the day despite the repeated use of airstrikes by the US, Coalition forces in the south have had similar experiences.
As the Taleban realise that their mass assault tactics are ineffective due to the attrition rate, they will move more to AQ tactics. Again though we must realise the Taleban are not just one group but several so there tactical thinking changes dependent on who is responsible for the attack.
Reference the NGO's if you look at the rate of incidents targeting them it is steadily increasing, which to me suggests a trend..? Particularly as the Taleban do not want large scale development, i.e construction of schools for girls etc as this erodes their support base, especially in the ethnically Pashtu areas.
Then again there are really two Afghanistans at the moment, the southern provinces where the war is raging, and the relatively stable Northern provinces. Perhaps you could arrange a field trip south with the Danes? it could be good for up to date information?
Regards,
James
Taliban ops...
Posted by
Tim Foxley
at
2008-09-09 11:35
James, hi and apologies for my poor phrasing - I didn't intend to sugggest that it was AQ where happy "running around with an AK and an RPG", I meant this is what the Taliban still seem most comfortable with. Suicide bombing is of course a newer tactic that didn't appear during the anti-Soviet Jihad in the 1980s. That seems to have come from the Taliban's awareness of and links to the wider world - and largely this means AQ. I was more taking issue with your use of the term "fundamental shift" when talking about attacks on NGOs or Taliban tactics moving from infantry assaults to terrorism. Attacks against NGOs going up each year is a trend of course, but not a fundamental shift. Taliban tactics have evolved slowly in fits and starts from 2002, all tactics are still on the cards and by far the majority of what the Taliban do, in my view, would still not have been out of place against the Soviets in the 80s. The only exception is suicide bombing. And I don't think this has been entirely embraced by the Taliban "movement" - in fact I think there is unease about its use amongst many members, particularly when Afghan civilian bodycount goes up. As you rightly point out, there are many different "types" of Taliban fighter.
I still don't feel the Taliban are as close to AQ in terms of idealogy and tactics as you seem to suggest. I always thought there had been a certain amount of tension between them, although admittedly they both need each other and have some goals in common. You're right about the Taliban losing their fear of airpower - I think they are learning how long aircraft take to arrive on the scene and also in the media they are exploiting the civilian casualties caused by airpower. I'd be interested in your thoughts on my latest posting - have you seen the new Human Rights Watch report on casualties caused by US airpower?
Interesting debating point - if AQ had never happened, but ISAF/NATO were still in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban, would the Taliban ever have adopted suicide bombing as a tactic anyway? I say yes, very possibly...
A trip down south with the Danes? No thanks, can't stand salted herring... :)
Cheers
Tim
I still don't feel the Taliban are as close to AQ in terms of idealogy and tactics as you seem to suggest. I always thought there had been a certain amount of tension between them, although admittedly they both need each other and have some goals in common. You're right about the Taliban losing their fear of airpower - I think they are learning how long aircraft take to arrive on the scene and also in the media they are exploiting the civilian casualties caused by airpower. I'd be interested in your thoughts on my latest posting - have you seen the new Human Rights Watch report on casualties caused by US airpower?
Interesting debating point - if AQ had never happened, but ISAF/NATO were still in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban, would the Taliban ever have adopted suicide bombing as a tactic anyway? I say yes, very possibly...
A trip down south with the Danes? No thanks, can't stand salted herring... :)
Cheers
Tim
timing